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7	United States of America		
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9	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
10	EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
11	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	CASE NO. 1:20-CR-00019 DAD-BAM	
12	Plaintiff,	STIPULATION TO CONTINUE STATUS	
13	v.	CONFERENCE DATE AND ORDER THEREON	
14	ADRIAN ALVARADO, ET. AL.	Date: April 27, 2020	
15	Defendants.	Time: 1:00 p.m. Honorable Barbara A. McAuliffe	
16			
17			
18	The United States of America, by and through MCGREGOR W. SCOTT, United States		
19	Attorney, and KATHLEEN A. SERVATIUS and KATHERINE E. SCHUH, Assistant United States		
20	Attorneys, and the defendants, by and through their respective attorneys of record, hereby stipulate to		
21	continue the status conference in this case from April 27, 2020 until June 22, 2020 at 1:00 p.m and for		
22	such time between those dates be excluded from the calculation as to the time within which the		
23	defendants should be tried.		
24	On March 17, 2020, this Court issued General Order 611, which suspends all jury trials in the		
25	Eastern District of California scheduled to commence before May 1, 2020. This General Order was		
26	entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19.		
27	Although the General Order addresses the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has		
28	emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act's end-of-justice provision "counteract[s] substantive		

openendedness with procedural strictness," "demand[ing] on-the-record findings" in a particular case. *Zedner v. United States*, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). "[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no exclusion under" § 3161(h)(7)(A). *Id.* at 507. And moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. *Id.* at 509; *see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez*, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a judge ordering and ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record "either orally or in writing").

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory and inexcusable—the General Order requires specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if "the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless "the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." *Id*.

The General Order excludes delay in the "ends of justice." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance following Mt. St. Helens' eruption. *Furlow v. United States*, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. *Id.* at 767-68; *see also United States v. Correa*, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing *Furlow* to exclude time following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules.

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-of-justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). If continued, this Court should designate a new date for the [event]. *United States v. Lewis*, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial continuance must be "specifically limited in time").

## **STIPULATION**

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through their respective counsels of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

- 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 27, 2020.
- 2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to continue the status conference until June 22, 2020, and to exclude time between April 27, 2020, and June 22, 2020, under Local Code T4.
  - 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
  - a) The discovery associated with this case includes voluminous investigative reports, wire interceptions recordings and electronic messages, precise location information data, and more, approximately 82,000 pages/files. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
  - b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to review discovery and to confer with their respective clients regarding a potential resolution of this matter.
  - c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
    - d) The government does not object to the continuance.
  - e) In addition to the public health concerns cited by General Order 611 and presented by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, an ends-of-justice delay is particularly apt in this case because counsel or other relevant individuals have been encouraged to telework and minimize personal contact to the greatest extent possible. It will be difficult to avoid personal contact should the hearing proceed.
  - f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
  - g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of April 27, 2020 to June 22, 2020, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4]

1	because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of		
2	the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interes		
3	of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.		
4	4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the		
5	Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial		
6	must commence.		
7	IT IS SO STIPULATED.		
8	Dated: April 1, 2020	MCGREGOR W. SCOTT United States Attorney	
10		/s/ Kathleen A. Servatius	
11		KATHLEEN A. SERVATIUS Assistant United States Attorney	
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13	DATED: April 1, 2020	/s/ John Kemper Jackson John Kemper Jackson	
14		Attorney for Adrian Alvarado	
15	DATED: April 1, 2020	/s/James Homola	
16		James Homola Attorney for Defendant Alex Melchor-Guzman	
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18	DATED: April 1, 2020	/s/ Kevin P. Rooney Kevin P. Rooney	
19		Attorney for Defendant Adrian Lopez	
20	<u>ORDER</u>		
21	IT IS SO ORDERED that the Status Conference is continued from April 27, 2020 to <b>June 22,</b>		
22	2020 at 1:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe. Time is excluded pursuant to 18		
23	U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv).		
24	IT IS SO ORDERED.		
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26	Dated: <b>April 2, 2020</b>	/s/ <b>Barbara A. McAuliff</b> UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE	
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